“板橋杯”青年翻譯競賽作為專業(yè)且極具品牌特色的軍事翻譯賽事，自2008年至今已成功舉辦了十四屆，為社會發(fā)掘了一大批優(yōu)秀的青年翻譯人才。為進一步滿足日益擴大的軍事翻譯需求，瞄準發(fā)現(xiàn)和儲備具有國際視野的高水平、專業(yè)化新型軍事翻譯人才，現(xiàn)舉辦第十五屆“板橋杯”青年翻譯競賽。本屆大賽由江蘇省翻譯協(xié)會負責主辦，國防科技大學國際關系學院具體承辦。比賽不收取任何參賽費用。
主辦：江蘇省翻譯協(xié)會
承辦：國防科技大學國際關系學院
第十五屆“板橋杯”（Bambridge）青年翻譯競賽分筆譯和口譯兩項子賽事。具體參賽規(guī)則如下：
第一部分 筆譯比賽
競賽內容：軍事、外交、政治和國際關系等題材的文章，形式為英譯漢。
筆譯參賽原文：參賽人員請登陸江蘇省翻譯協(xié)會網站下載、查看通知附件或相關微信公眾號。
參賽對象：
江蘇省翻譯協(xié)會會員和團體會員（參賽選手需年齡40周歲以下）
譯文要求：
1.參賽譯文需用電腦A4紙宋體小四號打印。譯文正文內請勿書寫譯者姓名或透露任何有關譯者的個人信息。
2.參賽譯文請將報名表作為封面，寫清參賽者的姓名、性別、出生年月、工作（學習）單位、聯(lián)系電話和地址，參賽譯文需郵寄紙質版到指定地址（南京市雨花區(qū)板橋街道國際關系學院軍事翻譯教研室 ，郭瓊（老師）收，郵編：210039）。
3.同時將譯文電子稿發(fā)送至競賽專用郵箱：guoqiong@nudt.edu.cn，主題以姓名+譯文題名標注。
4.參賽譯文須獨立完成，杜絕抄襲現(xiàn)象。一經發(fā)現(xiàn)，將取消參賽資格。
獎項設置：筆譯比賽設特等獎四名，一等獎十二名，二等獎二十名，三等獎若干名，并設優(yōu)秀指導教師獎。
頒獎典禮：本屆競賽頒獎典禮將于2023年6月下旬（具體時間待通知）在國防科技大學國際關系學院教學樓軍事外交模擬中心舉行，筆譯獲獎證書將通過郵寄或郵件方式發(fā)放，獲獎人員將受邀參加頒獎典禮。
截止日期：2023年4月1日（參賽譯文投遞截止日期以寄出郵戳為準）。
投寄（掛號）地址：南京市雨花區(qū)板橋街道國際關系學院軍事翻譯教研室
郭瓊（老師）收 郵編：210039
（請在信封上注明：“參賽譯文”字樣，只接受郵局投遞和EMS。）
聯(lián)系人：郭（老師）電話：13814003496
武（老師）電話：13382054161
第十五屆“板橋杯”（Bambridge）青年翻譯筆譯競賽參賽報名表
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第二部分 口譯比賽
競賽內容：
本屆口譯競賽形式為對話口譯（中英交替?zhèn)髯g），參賽對象以邀請賽方式進行。
參賽對象：
江蘇省翻譯協(xié)會會員和團體會員（參賽選手需年齡40周歲以下）
報名要求：
1. 每所院校限報兩名參賽選手，各院校負責組織本校的初選工作。
2. 擬報名參賽的選手需要在截止日期前將參賽報名表寄回，寫清參賽者的姓名、性別、出生年月、工作（學習）單位、聯(lián)系電話和地址。
獎項設置：口譯比賽設特等獎二名，一等獎四名，二等獎六名，三等獎若干名，并設優(yōu)秀指導教師獎。
比賽時間及頒獎典禮：本屆口譯競賽將于2023年6月下旬（具體時間待通知）頒獎典禮之前在國防科技大學國際關系學院教學樓軍事外交模擬中心舉行，比賽結束后當場頒獎。
報名截止日期：2023年4月1日（投遞截止日期以寄出郵戳為準）。
投寄（掛號）地址：南京市雨花區(qū)板橋街道國際關系學院國際軍事合作教研室
武媛媛（老師）收 郵編：210039
（請在信封上注明：“口譯報名”字樣，只接受郵局投遞和EMS。）
聯(lián)系人： 武（老師）電話：13382054161
第十五屆“板橋杯”（Bambridge）青年翻譯口譯競賽參賽報名表
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“板橋杯”青年筆譯競賽原文
21st-Century Combined Arms
Current events show us that the character of combined arms is changing in three primary ways. First, continuing advancements in information and related technologies, particularly in the areas of cyberspace, space, and influence technologies like social media, provide a widening array of capabilities that can be combined to generate advantages. Integrating these information capabilities with maneuver and lethal fires to present a dilemma at the right time and place is key to 21st-century combined arms. To illustrate the expanding use of technology, consider the near-realtime view of the unfolding conflict in Ukraine that we have all witnessed through various media. The widespread use of social media to livestream battles was unfathomable 20 or 30 years ago, but today demonstrates the power of using information as a means of exploiting tactical events to mobilize public opinion and galvanize will on a national or global scale.
Second, the delivery of combined arms has changed a great deal due to the mature precision-strike regime (MPSR). Integrating this level of precision into combined arms is changing how competitors and enemies approach warfighting. The proliferation of the MPSR places a premium on winning the all-domain reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance fight. The actor who wins this fight can apply combined arms, with the loser suffering the consequences. Furthermore, the actor who best exploits the massive amounts of data generated by the widespread proliferation of sensors gains a tremendous advantage in the reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance fight. The side which can make sense of the data faster than the other will find and engage targets faster than the other. In this way, the reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance fight, and therefore combined arms in the 21st century, presents a “big data” exploitation challenge.
The third change we are witnessing is the use of combined arms across the competition continuum. Understanding this change requires adopting an expanded concept of combined arms that makes it as applicable below the violence threshold as it is above. We see examples of this at work in places where our competitors create dilemmas against their neighbors who are allied with the United States, and where the competitor seeks objectives without triggering a military response from the targeted nation, or the United States.
If our frame for understanding 20th-century combined arms involved combining supporting arms, organic fires, and maneuver, then our frame for 21st-century combined arms should involve combining supporting arms, organic fires, maneuver, and information. Information is added as a component of 21st-century combined arms because it underpins many of the changes underway in broader society, the global security environment, and in the Marine Corps. The digital transformation of our networked society and Marine Corps is characterized by hyper-connectivity, mass data storage and computational power, and the fusion and correlation of data to drive outcomes. These information-based changes introduce vulnerabilities and opportunities that were not possible in previous decades. In response to this new reality the Marine Corps established the information warfighting function to formalize an approach to leveraging the power of information in campaigning, operations, and combined arms. Through combined arms, Marines integrate the functions of information, and associated capabilities, with fires and maneuver to create no-win situations for our competitors and enemies.
A key feature of the refined model of 21st-century combined arms is the concept of information fires and information maneuver. An example of information fires is conducting a cyberspace or electromagnetic attack to deceive the enemy or destroy the enemy s critical systems. An example of information maneuver is altering, suppressing, or manipulating electronic, digital, or physical signatures to deceive the enemy, reveal or conceal a capability or movement, or to slow the enemy’s decision making.
The MEU is well trained and equipped to perform 21st-century combined arms. To illustrate how the MEU can perform 21st-century combined arms, consider a hypothetical MEU mission to strike and eliminate a high-value individual (HVI) (e.g., key leader, technical expert, financier) within a violent extremist organization (VEO). In this scenario, the MEU creates a combined arms dilemma by using one capability to deny the HVI use of a critical asset, another to track the HVI, and yet another to strike and eliminate the HVI when the individual attempts to access, use, or repair the asset. This technique of “herding” individuals to a specific location to address a problem exposes them to physical harm.
In this example, the MEU--working under the authority of the combatant commander, and in concert with applicable intelligence agencies and the Department of State--is assigned the mission to disrupt a VEO’s online media operations. The VEO’s core leadership group is located in a relatively small and geographically isolated area within the MEU’s reach. However, its media operations, to include its propaganda and recruitment efforts, are highly sophisticated and effective at projecting an outsized image through a global online presence. This presence has proved effective at increasing the groups support, funding, and influence, and thus represents a growing threat.
For this mission, the MEU receives intelligence on the physical locations of the VEO’s media production studio, primary server, and backup server. These three assets are located in two separate buildings approximately three miles apart. At the designated time, the MEU’s cyber planner coordinated with USCYBERCOM, through the geographic combatant commander, to initiate the pre-planned denial of service attack (a form of information fires) against the VEO’s servers. At the same time, the MEU’s psychological operations detachment delivers tailored messages via cell phone (a form of information maneuver) to the VEO’s chief of media operations (the HVI). These carefully crafted, pre-approved messages are consistent with the HVI’s language, culture, and current events in the local area. This makes the HVI unsuspecting when notified of the malfunctioning servers.
As the cyber-attack and deceptive messaging occur, MEU reconnaissance teams occupy positions to observe and report on all relevant activity at the two locations. A cascade of rapidly unfolding events is triggered when the HVI arrives at the primary site to investigate the server issue. These events begin with the reconnaissance report notifying the MEU commander of the HVI’s arrival. The commander’s decision to strike unleashes two orbiting F-35’s waiting to deliver ordinance on both locations. The no-win situation created by this scenario is either accepting disrupted media operations or attempting to repair and suffer physical harm and destruction. The strike results in eliminating the HVI, several support personnel, and destroys the buildings housing the studio and both servers.
To compete and fight effectively in the 21st century the Marine Corps must adapt to the evolving security environment by applying a modern approach to 21st-century combined arms. The combined arms approach is how the Marine Corps executes maneuver warfare. Rapid, flexible, and opportunistic maneuver can only be accomplished by a combined arms force and through a diversity of means that maximizes combat power, flexibility, and responsiveness.
